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Throughout the past decade of wars, the U.S. has deployed unmanned aerial systems, 
commonly referred to as drones, from Africa to Asia collecting intelligence and targeting 
adversaries.  The nation now stands at a crossroad seeking to develop future American 
drone policy against an evolving threat while at the same time shaping global norms.  The 
past decade of American drone use focused on short-term benefits, intelligence collection 
and lethal targeting, rather than on the long-term consequences of technology diffusion, 
or ethical and legal frameworks.  Myopic drone strategies threaten to establish a global 
precedent that could undermine the stability of international relations, as state and non-
state actors (SANSA) have begun to build, arm, and operate lethal unmanned systems at 
an alarming rate.  Unmanned technology development and usage is outpacing 
international norms, regulations, and policies.  These systems will usher in an era of 
unrestricted drone usage unless international regulations and standards are developed. 
This thesis examines whether American drone strategy is myopic and whether it is 
creating a dangerous international precedent.  A qualitative analysis will identify the 
short-term benefits and long-term consequences of U.S. drone strategy, focusing on 
unmanned technology diffusion, ethical justifications, and legal frameworks.  Examining 
American drone strategy can help explain why a myopic policy may be beneficial in the 
short-term, yet may increase threats to national interests in the long-term.  The thesis 
concludes with an assessment of whether strategic myopia has already set a dangerous 
international precedent, which SANSA will use to justify their future drone programs. 
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A. BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
The gruesome murder of 13 sailors by a notorious drug lord forced military 
officials to plan capture-or-kill operations in response to calls for revenge.  The drug lord 
is a known smuggler, kidnapper, and pirate of commercial naval vessels.  Unable to get 
accurate intelligence on the culprit’s whereabouts, as he finds sanctuary in a neighboring 
country, officials choose to utilize their fleet of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), 
commonly referred to as drones.  The systems provide valuable targeting data near the 
murderer’s safe house in a remote mountainous area.  Due to the extreme risks of 
entering the area to make an arrest, the military decides that the best option is to conduct 
a lethal strike against the individual with an armed drone.  
This sounds similar to decisions that American political and military officials 
have made countless times throughout the past decade of fighting against terrorists.  
However, the above-mentioned event occurred in October 2012, as Chinese military 
officials debated whether to use an armed drone to conduct a lethal strike into Myanmar 
to kill the drug lord.1  The Chinese eventually decided against the use of a drone strike, 
opting to use local law enforcement to capture him.  The incident highlights the 
capabilities of the Chinese unmanned program, plus a growing international threat as 
state and non-state actors (SANSA) seek to capitalize on unmanned technologies.  Many 
of these SANSA are less discriminating in utilizing military force than the U.S.2 
The United States’ interest in unmanned vehicles dates back to 1917.  Charles F. 
Kettering developed the Kettering aerial torpedo, nicknamed the “Bug.”3  This system 
consisted of pre-set pneumatic and electrical controls that stabilized and guided it toward 
                                                 
1 Jane Perlez, “Chinese Plan to Kill Drug Lord with Drone Highlights Military Advances,” New York 
Times, February 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/asia/chinese-plan-to-use-drone-
highlights-military-advances.html. 
2 Jim Michaels, “Experts: Drones Basis for New Global Arms Race,” USA Today, January 9, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-
race/1819091/. 
3 National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, “Kettering Aerial Torpedo ‘Bug,’” March 21, 2007, 
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=320. 
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a target where it could detonate 180 pounds of explosives on contact.  The Bug never 
flew in combat or developed further; however, the innovation paved the way for future 
American unmanned technology. 
Innovations continued after World Wars I and II, and drones finally got a chance 
to fly combat operations during the Vietnam War.  For example, the AQM-34 Ryan 
Firebee flew 34,000 operational surveillance missions over Southeast Asia between 1964 
and 1975, with an estimated 83 percent of the aircraft returning to fly another day.4  The 
Firebee proved extremely reliable and highlighted the benefits of unmanned systems 
compared to manned aircraft, never losing a single pilot lost while collecting valuable 
intelligence.  The research, development, and deployment of drones continued for the 
next several decades, primarily flying surveillance missions in Bosnia and Desert Storm.   
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror have made drones 
the American weapon of choice for eliminating terrorists and their safe-havens.  The first 
lethal strike occurred over the skies of Yemen in 2002, when an American armed 
Predator fired its payload, killing the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) and an 
American citizen who was an al-Qaeda (AQ) operative.5  This strike ushered in a new era 
of American responses to terrorism and unmanned warfare.  As operations tempo 
(OPTEMPO) increased against an expanding threat, so too did the demand for drones.  
American officials decided to increase its drone inventory to over 7,500 throughout the 
next several years.6  Simultaneously, numerous international organizations and nations 
raised ethical and legal questions with regard to the use of drones for lethal operations. 
Following that first strike, American armed drones inflicted a number of lethal 
blows against terrorist networks.  They eliminated key members of AQ and its affiliates, 
denying safe havens in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia at minimal financial cost, less risk 
to military forces, and fewer casualties than alternative methods.  Strikes in those 
                                                 
4 NOVA, “AQM-34 Ryan Firebee,” Public Broadcasting Service, accessed June 6, 2013, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/uavs_09.html. 
5 Mary O’Connell, “International Law of Drones,” The American Society of International Law 14, no. 
38 (2010): 1.  
6 Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” last modified January 2013, Council on 
Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736. 
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countries killed 4,700 militants, including 50 senior leaders of AQ and Taliban, accord.7  
In addition to the leadership degradation, drones are eliminating lower level militants that 
possess special skills in bomb making, financing, and recruitment.  The impact of the 
strikes created a sense of fear amongst the remaining AQ senior leaders, forcing the 
network to spread across the globe in search of new hiding areas.  Documents discovered 
during the Abbottabad raid highlights Osama Bin Laden’s fear as he issued guidance to 
his deputies about how to avoid drone strikes.8  Despite his advice, lethal strikes 
continued creating tension within the network. 
In addition, lethal strikes also have an impact on civilian societies.  Four 
databases consolidate the best publically available data on drone strikes: New American 
Foundation (NAF),9 The Long War Journal (LWJ),10 the University of Massachusetts 
(UMASS Drone),11 and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ).12  There are 
concerns to the accuracy of the open source reporting used in the databases; however, 
these statistics highlight the extensive use of drones and resulting civilian deaths.13  
Averaging the four database totals for Pakistan alone, since 2004, the U.S. conducted 357 
strikes resulting in 2,648 militants killed along with 241 civilians (see Table 1).  Despite  
 
 
                                                 
7 Amanda Terkel, “Lindsey Graham: Drone Strikes Have Killed 4,700 People,” Huffington Post, 
February 21, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/lindsey-graham-drone-
strikes_n_2734133.html. 
8 Pam Benson, “Bin Laden Documents: Fear of Drones,” CNN Security Clearance (blog), May 3, 
2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/03/bin-laden-documents-fear-of-drones/. 
9 New America Foundation, Pakistani Drone Analysis, last modified July 31, 2013, accessed August 
31, 2013, http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis.  
10 Bill Rogio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013,” 
Long War Journal, last modified August 31, 2013, accessed September 3, 2013, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.  
11 University of Massachusetts Dartmouth Research Project, “UMASS Drone,” last modified August 
31, 2013, accessed September 2, 2013, http://umassdrone.org/index.  
12 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Covert Wars on Terror: The Data Sets, last updated August 1, 
2013, accessed September 3, 2013, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/obama-2013-
pakistan-drone-strikes/. 
13 Avery Plaw, “Counting the Dead: The Proportionality of Predation in Pakistan,” in Killing by 
Remote Control: The Ethics of Unmanned Military, ed. Bradley Jay Strawser (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 137. 
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uncertainties about the numbers, they do show that civilian casualties are low in relation 
to militants.14  Yet, these statistics continue to raise ethical and legal issues regarding 
utilization of drones to target terrorists. 
 
Table 1.   Reporting of Pakistan Drone Strikes As of August 201315 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 152.  










Civilian Deaths as 
Percentage of Total
New America 
Foundation 2004-07 10 179 101 16 56.42%
2008 36 298 28 47 9.40%
2009 54 549 70 92 12.75%
2010 122 849 16 45 1.88%
2011 73 517 62 35 11.99%
2012 48 306 0 33 0.00%
2013 17 107 4 0 3.74%
Total 2004 - 2013 360 2805 281 268 13.74%
Bureau of Investivage 
Journalism 2004-07 11 151 108 -- 71.52%
2008 38 252 59 -- 23.41%
2009 54 473 100 -- 21.14%
2010 128 874 84 -- 9.61%
2011 75 447 52 -- 11.63%
2012 48 229 4 -- 1.75%
2013 18 79 0 -- 0.00%
Total 2004-2013 372 2505 407 -- 19.87%
Long Wars Journal 
2004-07 10 215 20 -- 9.30%
2008 35 286 31 -- 10.84%
2009 53 463 43 -- 9.29%
2010 117 801 14 -- 1.75%
2011 64 405 30 -- 7.41%
2012 46 300 4 -- 1.33%
2013 19 88 11 -- 12.50%
Total 2004 - 2013 344 2558 153 -- 7.49%
UMASS Drone 2004-07 10 176 34 87 19.32%
2008 34 272 19 55 6.99%
2009 54 592 44 96 7.43%
2010 132 864 13 173 1.50%
2011 73 512 9 118 1.76%
2012 50 310 3 24 0.97%
Total 2004-2012 353 2726 122 553 6.33%
Total Average of 4 
databases 357.25 2648.5 240.75 9.09%
PAKISTAN
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Despite the successes of lethal drone operations, remnants of AQ core leadership 
continue to enjoy sanctuary in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).  
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to expand control in Yemen, while 
planning attacks against the U.S. homeland and radicalizing individuals across the globe.  
Regional AQ affiliates, Somali al-Shabaab, Malian al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), and Nigerian Boko Haram, continue to expand dark networks throughout global 
ungoverned territories.  Senator John McCain argues that AQ is not on the run but 
expanding all over the Middle East, from Mali to Yemen and all places in between.16  
The evolution of AQ’s global network still poses a threat to American national interests 
U.S. decision makers seek development of national drone policy to provide a standard for 
future administrations. 
As wars end and budgets are constrained, the U.S. searches for alternative 
missions to utilize its expansive unmanned fleet’s capabilities.  The new aim is to provide 
partner nations the use of drone technology to combat threats that may have a national or 
regional destabilizing effect.17  New drone bases are allowing operations to shift amongst 
other hot spots around the world (see Figure 1).  The U.S. is creating new hubs built in 
Seychelles, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Turkey to participate in intelligence sharing operations 
with partner nations.18  These operations will focus on intelligence collection rather than 
lethal operations, limiting direct U.S. involvement but strengthening global partners. 
                                                 
16 White House, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” news release, May 
23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
university. 
17 Eric Schmitt, “Drones in Niger Reflect New U.S. Tack on Terrorism,” New York Times, July 10, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/africa/drones-in-niger-reflect-new-us-approach-in-terror-
fight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 






Figure 1.  American Expanded Drone Operations19 
An example of this next phase of American drone usage is Operation Nomad 
Shadow.  This once-classified U.S. military operation helped Turkish military target 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fighters that cross the Iraqi-Turkish border.20  High-
resolution imagery beamed back to Turkish armed forces helped them pursue the rebels, 
as they slipped back and forth across the mountainous border with Iraq.  Similarly, in 
January 2013, American drones enabled French forces to fight against AQIM as the 
group seized town and villages in northern Mali.21  The use of American unmanned 
technology allowed French and Nigerian forces to recapture lost territory and force the 
AQIM fighters to seek refuge. These operations may continue to expand as American 
policy-makers hope to aid allies while continuing to apply pressure against global dark 
networks. 
                                                 
19 Whitlock, “U.S. Shifts Drones to New Frontiers,” 2013 
20 Ibid.  
21 Eric Schmitt and Scott Savare, “U.S. Opens Drone Base in Niger, Building Africa Presence,” New 
York Times, February 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-
up-drone-base.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Drones are here to stay.  Despite President Obama’s recent foreign policy speech 
in May 2013 calling for an American reduction of usage, they remain Washington’s 
weapon of choice.22  Especially for SANSA that seek to limit the growing threats to 
national interests, as evident by Chinese consideration whether to conduct a lethal cross-
border strike into Myanmar.  This will inevitably result in additional international 
incidents, which risk dragging nations into conflicts that they would otherwise avoid if 
not for drones.  The U.S. must develop a transparent national policy that will help frame 
international guidelines for the ethical and legal use of drones. 
B. SIGNIFICANE OF THE STUDY 
Unmanned technology is proliferating at an alarming rate as the unmanned market 
lacks regulation and accountability.  Analysts predict that drone demand will quadruple 
over the next decade, largely due to successful U.S. unmanned operations in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars.23  Drones provide SANSA with the ability to conduct intelligence 
operations cheaply, while maintaining the safety of their fighting forces.  There are 
currently 76 nations, an increase of 45 over the past decade, that seek to develop 
indigenous unmanned programs used primarily for surveillance but capable of lethal 
operations as well (see Figure 2).24  The Teal Group predicts that worldwide drone 
markets will more than double over the next decade from current expenditures of $5.2 
billion annually to $11.6 billion.25  The market continues to grow as the demand for these 
systems increase. 
                                                 
22 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Foreign 
Affairs, July−August 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139453/daniel-byman/why-drones-
work?cid=oth-cfr-callout-ja13-061813. 
23 Tia Goldenberg, “Israel Leads Global Drone Exports as Demand Grows,” The Times of Israel, July 
21, 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-leads-global-drone-exports-as-demand-grows/. 
24 Thomas Melito, Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information and End-Use Monitoring 
on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports (GAO-12-536), 2012, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536. 




Figure 2.  Countries Acquiring Drones Since December 201126 
As the United States military withdraws from Afghanistan, the nation stands at a 
crossroad seeking to develop national drone policy against an evolving threat.  The 
recently signed “Presidential Policy Guidance” promulgates a code drone use for future 
administrations.27  However, the administration has yet to codify national drone policy, 
which is having an impact on how SANSA develop and deploy future unmanned 
systems.  It may already be too late to influence SANSA programs. 
A decade of American drone strategy has framed international perceptions for 
using such systems.  Peter Singer, a Brookings Institute drone expert, has argued the 
Obama administration has been plagued with making short-term calculations on security 
issues with long-term impacts.28  If American drone myopia exists, it may foster  
 
                                                 
26 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nonproliferation, 10. 
27 White House, “Remarks by the President,” 2013. 
28 Peter Singer, “Finally, Obama Breaks His Silence on Drones,” Brookings Institute, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/23-drones-obama-singer. 
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international norms that will lower the threshold for SANSA to engage in hostile actions 
with little fear of reprisal.  Despite recent efforts, U.S. policy makers continue to wrestle 
with the long-term consequences of drone usage. 
Drones threaten the future stability of international relations by providing allies 
and adversaries the capability to violate sovereign national boundaries to conduct 
surveillance or lethal operations with little risk, politically or militarily.  The complex and 
controversial use of these systems, for lethal targeting and surveillance, is creating 
distinct problems for the United States as the administration remains myopically focused 
in regards to its drone strategy (see Table 2).  Unless properly governed and regulated 
internationally, SANSA may utilize drones with little ethical restraint or legal oversight.  
The U.S. short-term focus on counter-terrorist (CT) operations and simultaneous ignoring 
of long-term consequences is creating three larger issues that threaten America’s national 
interests. 
 
Table 2.   Drone Myopia Matrix 
First, the threat posed from global diffusion of unmanned technology is 
increasing, as the technology has outpaced regulations.  The U.S. faces the threat of 
adversaries using a twenty-first century technology with twentieth-century rules.29  
Exporting unmanned technologies provides short-term monetary incentives, 
interoperability with partner nations, and continues technology research and 
development.  However, diffusion is creating long-term consequences as adversaries 
acquire the technology available by capitalizing on a “free ride” of available technology.  
                                                 
29 Peter Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 382. 
Myopia Short-term Benefit Long-Term Consequences
DIFFUSION Exports Money Adversarial Acquisition
Capacity Building National Security Lower Aggression Threshold
R & D Innovation Counter-Measures
ETHICAL/LEGAL Just War Theory Self-defense Adversarial Justification
AUMF Lethal Operations Blowback
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This not only helps adversaries produce their own systems, but also allows them to create 
dangerous drone counter-measures. The lack of regulation allows the free flow of 
information and lethal technology to SANSA threatening national interests. 
Second, the U.S. cannot continue operating drones without backlash from 
domestic and international communities based on myopic ethical justifications.  The U.S. 
justifies using drones based on traditional just war theory (JWT) reasoning, maintaining 
the right to self-defense against terrorist that pose harm to the nation.30  The U.S. 
maintains its ethical justification for drone use based on the global terrorist threat, which 
may be plausible in the short-term, but it fails to consider the long-term ethical impact on 
civilian societies and a lowering of the threshold for aggression, by SANSA.  Drones are 
not simply changing how the U.S. fights but who fights, transforming the very nature of 
war with significant long-term ethical implications.31  Drones provide a valuable 
capability to fight against adversaries, but failure to guide international ethical norms for 
these weapons threaten national interests worldwide. 
Third, the U.S. recently began publicly acknowledging the need for long-term 
legal standing for drones, but the lack of clarity and failure to institute an American legal 
framework sets a dangerous precedent for the global community.  Attorney General Eric 
H. Holder Jr. has stated that there are multiple “checks” inside the executive branch to 
make sure drone use is legally justified.32  However, the lack of transparent legal 
justification creates an international environment in which SANSA can justify their drone 
programs without legal rights and violate international human rights laws (IHRL).  The 
administration maintains its legal justification on the inherent right to self-defense, 
detailed in a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) memo, based on perceived “imminence” 
                                                 
30 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 2006), 59. 
31 Singer, Wired for War, 194. 
32 Scott Shane, “Judge Challenges White House Claims on Authority of Drone Killings,” New York 
Times, July 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/us/politics/judge-challenges-white-house-
claims-on-authority-in-drone-killings.html?src=recg. 
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of the threat.33  The subjective nature of terms used in the memo, such as “imminent,” 
“activities,” and “recently,” creates legal issues toward the use of drones.  The lack of a 
clear public policy creates perceived legal standings for other SANSA to use drones, 
threatening the international environment. 
Strategic myopia may set a dangerous precedent for international drone use that 
will threaten American national interests and global peace efforts.  The U.S. seeks to 
eliminate threats to the homeland; however are they ignoring possible long-term 
consequences of other nations using the technology in similar ways.  “People say what’s 
going to happen when the Chinese and the Russians get this technology? The president is 
well aware of those concerns and wants to set the standard for the international 
community on these tools,” said Tommy Vietor, a White House spokesperson.34  
However, U.S. decision-makers failure to implement such a national drone policy may 
have a lasting effect as they miss an opportunity to frame international norms. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The primary assumption of this research is that the U.S. will continue to utilize 
drones around the globe.  The American distaste for sustained casualties and shrinking 
military budgets will influence the continuation of American drone use.  Land wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been lengthy and costly, with 4,485 American troops killed in 
Iraq and more than 2,147 killed in the still-unfinished Afghanistan war.35  Although these 
numbers remain low compared to most war standards, the American public grows weary 
of soldier deaths and the high financial impacts.  Sequestration is having an impact on 
military budgets, but the global demand and a growing market will increase drone 
spending.  The fiscal year 2001 investment in drones was approximately $667 million, 
and for FY2012, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has asked for $3.9 billion in  
                                                 
33 Michael Isikoff, “Justice Department Memo: It’s Legal to Use Drone Strikes against Americans,” 
MSNBC, February 4, 2013, http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/04/exclusive-justice-department-memo-reveals-
legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans/. 
34 Tabassum Zakaria, “As Drone Monopoly Frays, Obama Seeks Global Rule,” Reuters, March 17, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/17/us-usa-security-drones-idUSBRE92G02720130317. 
35 Alan W. Dowd, “Drone Wars: Risk and Warnings,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly 
42, no. 1 (winter−spring 2013), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/. 
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procurement and development funding with much more planned for the future.36  Drones 
allow the U.S. to continue to fight against terrorism on a budget while protecting its 
service members. 
The second assumption is that the American drone industry’s desire to tap into 
global demand and export markets will further diffuse technology.  Two principal 
multilateral agreements that address exports of drones are the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar.37  The U.S. is a signatory to both; but SANSA 
that are non-signatories are free to export unmanned technology and knowledge without 
restrictions.  American drone industry leaders want the removal of restrictions to allow 
the U.S. to capitalize on the growing market.  Northrop Grumman CEO, Wes Bush is a 
vocal opponent of the agreements and states that controls “hurt” industry and the 
agreements “need an overhaul.”38  As military budgets shrink, drone industry 
corporations will pressure the U.S. to remove unmanned technology export restrictions. 
A third assumption pertains to the proliferation threat related primarily to medium 
and long-range drones only.  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
drone report, the majority of foreign drones acquired fall within the tactical category.  
Tactical systems conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 
typically have a limited operational range of 300 kilometers.39  Tactical and micro UAV 
technology is readily available at electronic stores across the globe. Medium and long-
range systems are of concern due to capabilities of longer flying distance and greater 
weapon payloads.  The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) divides drones into 
                                                 
36 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program 
Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011, 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Weapons.pdf , 1−1. 
37 MTCR, established in 1987, is a voluntary association of 34 countries that share the goal of limiting 
the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.  
Wassenaar, established in 1996, is a voluntary association of 41 countries that share the goal of limiting the 
spread of certain conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items having both civilian and military 
applications. 
38 Chris Cole, “Industry Lobbying to Change Drone Export Control Rules,” Drone Wars UK, 
November 11, 2011, http://dronewars.net/2011/11/28/industry-lobbying-to-change-drone-export-control-
rules/. 
39 Missile Technology Control Regime, “Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed August 13, 2013, 
http://www.mtcr.info/english/FAQ-E.html. 
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two separate categories, those capable of delivering 500 kilogram warhead further than 
300 kilometers (Cat I) and those that carry a lighter warhead or have a range of less than 
300 kilometers (Cat II).40  These categories allow for a determination of drone 
capabilities to place restriction on transfer of technologies, specifically category I 
systems.  However, all decisions of exports are on a national basis and there are no 
sanctions by other countries if MTCR is broken.41  This creates a system that has limited 
authority to control the diffusion of technology. 
A fourth assumption involves the accuracy of available information regarding 
drone strikes, as there is lack of consensus on the number of civilian deaths.  The four 
databases, mentioned earlier, differ significantly in relation to the number of civilians 
killed.42  The numbers of civilian deaths range from TBIJ’s 407 to UMASS Drone at 122 
(see Table 1).  Limited access to post-strike locations creates controversies over the 
accuracy of civilian death numbers, as militants typically cordon off strike areas.43  In 
addition, the descriptions of what constitutes a civilian create a larger difference in 
numbers; an example is the U.S. classification of any military aged male in the blast area 
as a combatant.44  The data in these databases is constantly changing, as new strike 
information becomes available or additional analysis added.  Despite the uncertainties, 
data from the four databases provide the widest range of sources and methodologies 
engaged to monitor drone strikes.45 
A fifth assumption concerns a familiarization with the traditional just war theory 
(JWT).  The JWT is a set of “articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal 
precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Chris Cole, “Mapping Drone Proliferation: Big Business vs. MTCR,” Drone Wars UK, September 
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42 Plaw, “Counting the Dead,” 136. 
43 Farhat Taj, “Drone Attacks,” Daily Times, January 2, 2012, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C01%5C02%5Cstory_2-1-2010_pg3_5. 
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judgment of military conduct.”46  Michael Walzer argues that independent of the justice 
for going to war (jus ad bellum); all combatants have an equal right to kill one another 
within war (jus in bello).47  This right stems from the inherent right to self-defense.  
However, recent just war revisionist theorist (McMahan and Strawser) argue against 
Walzer’s theory.48  They argue that not all combatants possess equal right to kill one 
another, only those that fight for a just cause.49  This sheds light on the drone debate, 
arguably justifying American use of drones for a just cause.  This debate is out of the 
scope of this research, but highlights the need for transparency of American ethical 
justifications. 
D. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
The term “myopia” refers to cognitive thinking and decision making that is 
narrow in scope, lacks foresight, lacks concern for wider interests or for long-term 
consequences.  It describes a decision that may be beneficial in the present but 
detrimental in the future, or a viewpoint that fails to consider anything outside a very 
narrow and limited range.50  In other words, it is doing things that make one better off 
sooner than later.  Within international relations, strategic myopia describes a failure to 
recognize future external long-term consequences because shared short-term perspectives 
blind decision-makers.51  This cognitive bias has a negative effect on policy, which 
results in shortsighted policies, as this thesis argues is the present case with drones. 
The term “diffusion” refers to the wide dissemination of social or intellectual 
capital from one culture to another.  Four factors influence diffusion: innovation, 
communication channels, time, and a social system.52  Together these factors contribute 
                                                 
46 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 44. 
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to the theory of diffusion of innovation, which seeks to explain how, why, and at what 
rate new ideas and technology spread through cultures.  Diffusion of unmanned 
technology represents a threat to the international community, as these systems provide 
unique capabilities.  Diffusion can be of value to societies that can benefit from access to 
technology innovation, but rapid diffusion with little regulation can be detrimental to 
national interests. 
Finally, description of these unmanned systems under examination varies.  
Among the names ascribed to them include, remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS), or more commonly called drones.  The DoD defines UAVs as powered, 
aerial vehicles that do not carry human operators, use aerodynamic forces to provide 
vehicle lift, fly autonomously or are piloted remotely, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal 
payload.53  The term UAS describes all the components that are vital to unmanned 
operations.  They are comprised of an unmanned aircraft (UA), payload, human operator, 
control element, display, communication architecture, life cycle logistics, and supported 
soldier.54  Note that UAS require more knowledge, training, and expertise to operate than 
the drones sold through Amazon or RadioShack.  While the terms may vary, for 
readability the use of the term drones follows throughout this thesis. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This thesis provides a qualitative analysis to determine if, indeed, American drone 
strategy is myopic, and if so, to what extent is it creating a potentially dangerous 
international precedent threatening American national interests.  This is not an attempt to 
address the moral and legal debates about the proper use of drones, but to investigate the 
impact of American policy on future SANSA usage.  The drone “arms race” is here, as 
state and non-state actors build, arm, and fly lethal unmanned systems.  The use of drones 
                                                 
53 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 
1-02) (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 563. 
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poses a risk of becoming an unregulated and unaccountable system to deploy immediate 
lethal force with murky ethical and legal justifications.  The U.S. cannot afford to 
continue drone operations while wishing away dangerous long-term consequences.  The 
U.S. must strengthen the MTCR to ensure strict monitoring of drone technology exports 
to limit SANSA access and develop an international legal framework to enforce ethical 
use of the systems. 
Chapter II examines whether the existence of American diffusion myopia is 
creating a dangerous international precedent.  Technology is quickly outpacing 
regulation, creating an international environment where SANSA desire a quick and cheap 
means to maintain security.  The first section discusses the short-term benefits gained 
through the continued use of drones without a clear national policy and industry’s desire 
for a share of the growing market.  These issues are at the heart of the precedent being set 
for SANSA to justify their use.  The second section discusses the long-term consequences 
from the diffusion of drone technology and the impacts on future international relations. 
Chapter III examines whether the existence of American drone ethical and legal 
myopia is creating a dangerous international precedence.  Drone operations are quickly 
outpacing policy.  Determining short-term benefits and long-term consequences provides 
an understanding to what extent, if any, American myopia exists.  The lack of clear legal 
and ethical justification may foster precedence for global unmanned programs to operate 
in violation of the JWT and law of armed conflict (LOAC), creating a dangerous 
international environment.  Additionally, as civilian deaths will grow, American 
strategies are creating animosity amongst civilian populations, shaping global perceptions 
that threaten national interests abroad.  The U.S. administration continues to rely on 
drones yet fails to produce national policy that will aid in framing international 
guidelines.  This may create a dangerous precedent for SANSA to use drone against 
adversaries without international legal penalty. 
Finally, Chapter IV concludes with an assessment of whether U.S. drone strategy 
is myopic and provides recommendations to reduce the threat thereby posed to the 
international community.  Without the proper regulation and governance of drone  
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technology, SANSA will follow American precedent and use these systems, threatening 
national interests.  Now is the time for U.S. administration to codify its drone strategy to 
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II. DIFFUSION MYOPIA 
This is a robotics revolution, but it’s not just an American revolution—
everyone’s involved, from Hezbollah to paparazzi.  
Peter Singer, Brookings Institute drone expert.55 
A. TECHNOLOGY OUTPACING REGULATION 
As countries of concern and terrorist organizations acquire unmanned technology, 
the U.S. faces increasing threat from diffusion myopia.  The U.S. government believes 
that SANSA pose little risk because of the technical expertise required to integrate 
unmanned technology successfully are too great.56  However, common amongst weapon 
innovations is how quickly actors adopt the technology and modify it for their own 
purposes.  The U.S must count on every other actor as having drones in the future and 
cannot assume that America will always have a technology advantage.57  Furthermore, 
what makes drones different, and even more dangerous, is not only the effectiveness of 
the weapon, but the lack of internationally accepted regulations that govern research and 
development (R&D), systems use, and exports of the technology.  Global diffusion of 
unmanned technology is quickly outpacing regulations. 
One issue influencing diffusion myopia is the lack of a cohesive drone export 
policy.  There are currently 50 countries producing over 900 different drones, as they 
seek to compete economically and militarily in the emerging field.58  The demand for 
these systems allow drone corporations to flood the global market, without strict export 
regulations, other than the non-binding MTCR and Wassenaar agreements.  Several 
countries of concern, China, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran, are non-signatories to the 
international agreements yet seek to acquire the technology and develop drone programs 
(see Table 3).  American allies (e.g., Israel, one of the largest exporters of unmanned 
                                                 
55 David Wood, “American Drones Ignite New Arms Race from Gaza to Iran to China,” Huffington 
Post, November 27, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones_n_2199193.html. 
56 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nonproliferation, 19. 
57 Singer, Wired for War, 268. 
58 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nonproliferation, 13. 
 20 
technology) continue to diffuse unmanned technology while not being a member of either 
agreement also.59  Whether adversary or ally, these countries raise concerns about 
nonmembers’ potential to undermine the MTCR’s ability to limit exports and diffusion.  
                                                 
59 Ibid., 11. 
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Table 3.   MCTR/Wassenaar/Drone Programs60 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 45−46. 
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A second issue that may influence diffusion myopia is efforts to build partner-
nation capacity to fight global threats.  Despite the highlighted threat posed from 
technology diffusion, the U.S. government remains committed to transferring unmanned 
technology to its allies.  This contradicts the core of current arms control measures, 
increasing the threat to national security.61  Once nations acquire drones, they are free to 
utilize the systems as they desire with no international norms or regulations in place to 
govern use; this lowers the threshold for the use of force. 
A third issue that may foster diffusion myopia is the desire for continued research 
and development of unmanned technology.  American R&D leads to innovation of 
smaller, faster, and quieter systems that expand future roles of the systems.  As 
highlighted earlier, the U.S. military and commercial industries export technology to 
garner capital for R&D.  However, this creates a “free-ride” for other SANSA that 
acquire knowledge to develop similar systems.62  An example is with the current 
development of micro drones, tiny weapons designed to attack in swarms, and stealth 
technology.  Both the U.S. and China are working to incorporate these technologies into a 
single system that will provide unique military capabilities.63  Not only do SANSA gain 
the capabilities they seek through diffusion, but they also gain insight into how to defeat 
unmanned technology through development of counter-measures. 
The following is an examination of the short-term benefits and the long-term 
consequences of the issues listed above to determine if American strategy is myopic and 
the nature of the threat posed to national interests. 
B. SHORT-TERM BENEFITS 
1. Money 
Exports of unmanned technologies provide short-term monetary incentives in an 
expanding global market.  Between 2005 and 2010, the U.S. approved over $388 million 
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dollars of drone exports with 1,278 approved licenses issued to U.S. Department of State 
(DOS) and 135 commercial corporations.64  These numbers are likely to grow along with 
greater demand for the systems, as drone industry leaders seek to maintain a strong 
defense industrial base.  The Aerospace Industries Association estimates the global drone 
market could be worth $89 billion over the next decade.65  An effective way for U.S. 
companies to stay competitive is to nurture its expertise in unmanned challenge areas 
(e.g., autonomous flight, control of multiple vehicles, command and control, 
communications bandwidth).66  If the U.S. fails to stay competitive in the growing 
market, European, Russian, Israeli, or Chinese companies will take over. 
Industry officials continue to lobby the Obama administration to lessen 
restrictions on exports.  Estimates of American drone expenditures are to double from 
$1.7 billion in 2011 to $3.5 billion in 2020.67  Industry pressures are having an impact on 
American policy. For example, government officials recently sponsored six proposals to 
amend the MTCR, five of which would have moved drones categorized as Category I to 
Category II, making them easier to export.68  Government officials continue to look for 
ways to lessen drone export restrictions to allow industry to remain competitive in the 
growing market, while monitoring growing threat. 
As military budgets shrink, the Pentagon is looking for ways to help struggling 
defense contractors.  A new pilot program seeks to help companies building their 
weapons strictly for exporting them to other countries.69  The DoD recently established 
guidelines enabling 66 countries eligible to buy U.S. drones; clearing the way for more 
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overseas sales.70  Industry officials praise the administrations for moves to boost arms 
exports, but are frustrated at delays in codifying new export policy as they look to offset 
spending cuts spurred by U.S. military budgets cuts.  Richard Genaille, Deputy Director 
of the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated, “It hasn’t moved quite as 
fast as we would like, but we’re not giving up.”71  U.S. defense exporters are at a 
disadvantage versus foreign competitors due to U.S. regulations governing exports of 
weapons and “dual-use” goods that have both civilian and military applications.72  
Continued pressure and lobbying against these regulations will increase the number of 
licenses for exports, further diffusing unmanned technologies. 
The monetary incentives and desire for drone industry to stay competitive in the 
market are fostering government officials to lessen the already loose agreements 
currently in place.  Singer, the Brookings Institution drone expert stated, “This is a 
revolution in which billions and trillions of dollars will be made. To stop it you’d have to 
first stop science, and then business, and then war.”73  Obviously stopping science, 
business, and war are unlikely; however, controlling exports will help curtail threats to 
national interests. 
2. National Security 
Partner-nation capacity building amongst allies provides the short-term benefit of 
reducing threats to national security.  American adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan 
drove the demand for drones as they hid amongst the civilian populations, requiring 
constant surveillance and quick strike capabilities that could minimize collateral 
damage.74  These same enemies are now moving beyond the battlefield and threaten 
civilian populations as they seek to wage jihad.  As the war in Afghanistan ends, 
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interoperability provides the United States and its global allies the ability to maintain 
pressure on global terrorist networks that threaten future security environment. 
The U.S. government continues selected technology transfers to further national 
security objectives.  This allows time for partner nations to strengthen their intelligence, 
law enforcement, and security apparatuses to catch up and overcome threats.75  These 
nations take advantage of the time and resources that the U.S. provides to its drone 
programs and quickly develop their own tactics, techniques, and procedures.  The transfer 
of these systems increase allies’ capabilities and strengthen the industrial base for drone 
production. 
The list of partner nations attempting to buy and develop their own programs is 
growing.  For example, Germany wants to buy Predator drones from the U.S. to obtain 
long-range surveillance capabilities.76  Neighboring Poland is looking at cancelling its 
manned fighter program for armed drones.77  In addition, Canada is planning a total of 
one billion dollars for its future program.78  Moreover, Australia military plans spending 
$3 billion on drones if allowed by its government.79  Also, Japan’s Ministry of Defense 
recently requested $3 billion yen to develop an indigenous drone program by 2019; 
however, the technology will ultimately come from the U.S.80  Even the United Nations 
is joining the trend, signing a contract for drone surveillance support over the Congo, 
despite ongoing investigations into American legal and ethical use of armed drones.81  
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These programs will provide the capabilities for partner nations and organizations to 
reduce global threats, protecting American national interests. 
Capacity building for our partner nations provides short-term security against 
threats to national interests.  The more partner nations that acquire drones the more 
pressure the international community can apply against global threats.  These systems 
provide allies greater ability to gain insight into ungoverned spaces and limit terrorist safe 
havens. 
3. Innovation 
The diffusion of drone technology creates global research and development 
(R&D), providing the short-term benefit of innovation of unmanned technology.  Exports 
of drones is allowing new experts to conduct R&D, increasing innovation required to 
maintain a share of the growing drone market.82  Revenues from exports are critical as it 
accounts for the majority of innovation capital.83 The development and use of unmanned 
technologies for other than lethal operations is only just beginning.  A search of the 
headlines reveals drones used to monitor insect breeding areas in Florida, drones used to 
identify wildfire hotspots to aid fire fighters, and game wardens tracking animal 
migration patterns.  Innovation allows for the creation of new systems that can satisfy the 
future demands of unmanned technologies. 
The military is conducting extensive R&D to innovate its systems for future 
combat uses.  The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently 
announced a contest to see who can design a UAV that can fit in a backpack and costs 
less than $10,000 dollars.84  This project will likely create innovation that will have far-
reaching benefits for the military.  DoD R&D funding continues to grow as the systems 
are relatively inexpensive and miniaturization of technology is helping accelerate new 
systems.85  In addition to the smaller and lighter systems, the U.S. Army is projecting 
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requirements for fully autonomous hypersonic systems by 2034.86  These systems will 
provide the long duration and deep penetration capabilities required for global force 
projection.  The advancement of this technology requires innovation from within the 
military and in conjunction with its civilian counterparts. 
Diffusion of unmanned technology is creating other venues for R&D and 
innovation.  The internet provides how-to guides for innovating new systems.  Members 
of online forums have been doing this for years on websites like DIYDrones.com.  The 
site, led by Wired magazine’s editor-in-chief, Chris Anderson, has 15,000 members 
exploring the boundaries of what is possible with do-it-yourself drone technology.87  
These types of collaboration sites will have an impact on the innovation of new systems 
across the globe.  Adversarial nation states are also aiding in the innovation of unmanned 
systems.  Similar to DARPA’s contest, Iran is looking to do the same with the Div-e-
Sepid contest, where competitors from 65 teams race their homemade drones around 
Mount Damavand.88 
These competitions and DIY efforts provide short-term innovation of unmanned 
technologies.  This allows the drone industry to remain competitive in the global market 
while developing beneficial systems for other than combat operations.  Expanded 
expertise and funding for R&D is innovating unmanned systems for future use across the 
globe. 
C. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES 
1. Adversarial Acquisition 
Exports of drones create long-term consequences as American adversaries 
acquire and develop indigenous systems.  These exports are placing American forward 
deployed troops at risk from covert collection of base security procedures and postures, 
as government officials have yet to codify use of the systems.  The acquisition of these 
systems without international norms and regulations in place allows SANSA to conduct 
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lethal operations following the American example.  “The problem is that we’re creating 
an international norm, asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect 
of planning attacks,” argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the 
University of Pittsburgh.89  This raises serious concerns as the administration has yet to 
develop a national policy that can help frame international guidelines. 
a. State Actors 
Government and military officials are voicing concerns about the threat 
posed by adversarial states’ acquisition of drones.  A recent Pentagon study highlights the 
“very serious threat” posed by enemy armed drones, which could target aircraft carriers, 
conduct cross-border operations creating chaos and confusion through swarming 
airspaces, and even close forward military bases that are in range of lethal drones.90  
China’s recent desire to use an armed drone to conduct lethal operations into Myanmar 
highlights this growing threat.  Pentagon officials worry about nation states that are 
engaging in efforts to develop and field advanced drones. 
China is quickly becoming a leader in the development and export of 
unmanned systems.  The sophistication of its program could challenge U.S. military 
dominance in the Asia-Pacific Theater and threaten neighbors over territorial disputes.91   
“China is following the precedent set by the U.S.  The thinking is that, if the U.S. can do 
it, so can we,” said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden.92  It is only a matter of time 
before China and other SANSA are able to arm its drones, rationalizing its program based 
on the American example. 
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Iran is another nation that is developing an extensive drone program that 
threatens regional security.  In May 2013, Iranian officials unveiled their new stealth 
drone, dubbed the Epic, which is capable of armed long-range operations.93  The Epic 
provides Iran with the ability to conduct covert surveillance missions against adversaries, 
capitalizing from U.S. tactics over the previous decade.  Iranian officials claim to have 
already conducted dozen of reconnaissance flights over Israel since 2006.94  Similar to 
China, Iran is exporting its unmanned technology and knowledge to its allies in an effort 
to bolster military ties and strength defenses, yet threatening international relations.  Syria 
and Venezuela are examples of countries that are reportedly equipped with Iranian 
drones.95  The proliferation and use of these systems remain unregulated and pose a 
threat to neighboring countries and their regions. 
North Korea (NK) claims to have lethal drones within its arsenal.  During 
a recent parade and military drill, it displayed several MQM Streakers, a 70s-era U.S. 
target drone it acquired from Syria.96  It is unconfirmed if the drones are currently 
capable of conducting lethal operations, but it is only a matter of time before NK can refit 
these older style drones into a lethal weapon.  The sophistication of this system is not at 
the level of American lethal drones, but highlights the desires of NK to enter the drone 
wars.  The speed at which theses nations are developing programs highlights how U.S. 
military successes with drones are changing strategic thinking worldwide. 
b. Non-State Actors 
Diffusion of drones to terrorists and other militants creates an even greater 
threat against American national interests.  Just as the U.S. has weaponized its Predator 
drones, the next step for militants is to turn their drones into guided weapon systems.  
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Non-state actors are harder to regulate than state actors are, but this highlights the 
growing threat from the diffusion of the unmanned technology and tactics.  Using a drone 
to carry out attacks presents many distinct advantages over conventional methods: ability 
to launch covertly from virtually anywhere, reach inaccessible targets, and cause mass 
panic with minimum risk to operators.  While non-state actors have not attacked using a 
drone yet, there are already signs that militants are developing these weapons. 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist group, has acquired Iranian-made drones 
that are flying over Israeli airspace.97  Hezbollah unmanned technology is not of the same 
quality of the American or Israeli systems; however, they provide a significant capability 
for Hezbollah.  An Israeli F-16 jet shot down a Hezbollah drone over the Mediterranean 
in August 2006 that had the ability to carry munitions.  It was an Iranian-made Ababil-T, 
which can be fitted with a 45 kg warhead, although the Israeli military said the one it had 
downed was unarmed.98  Hezbollah leverages U.S. precedent to justify its own drone use, 
claiming the right to self-defense as they gather intelligence over Israel.  Without the 
American drone example, Hezbollah would have a difficult time justifying an offensive 
program to the international community.  Critics may argue that Hezbollah would use 
drones despite the American precedent set, but Hezbollah most likely would not be using 
these systems if it were not for American diffusion of the technology and tactics. 
There are numerous other examples of non-state actors acquiring or 
attempting to acquire unmanned systems to use for malign intentions.  In 2004, the 
Palestinian militant group Hamas allegedly lost six members of its group when they died 
while packing explosives into a drone.99  In September 2005, the Pakistani Army 
announced it had seized a Chinese-made drone in a raid on a suspected AQ hideout in 
North Waziristan.  Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain told reporters that the militants had 
used the technology to “check the position of security forces and attack them,” adding 
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that the vehicle was also capable of carrying weapons.100  In 2006, a judge convicted Ali 
Asad Chandia, a teacher from Maryland in the U.S., for providing material support to the 
Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) by attempting to acquire a GPS 
guidance system for a model aircraft on the group’s behalf.101  These examples highlight 
the threat and intentions of non-state actors to utilize drones for lethal operations.  
Fortunately, they have been unable to produce a system capable of lethal operations yet; 
obtaining the system is only half the fight. 
Additionally, two U.S. security consultants proved what malign non-state 
actors may accomplish with the system called Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform 
(WASP).  The $6,000 dollar system consists of a surplus military target drone that comes 
equipped with programmable GPS, a mobile telephone base station so it can intercept 
phone calls, and hacking capabilities to break into WIFI networks.102  For a relatively 
cheap price, these consultants highlighted the existence of capabilities available to non-
state actors that provide rudimentary signals intelligence. 
Finally, an even greater threat to the homeland comes from homegrown or 
lone wolf actor’s possession of unmanned technology.  DIY kits aid in building drones 
for lone wolves or homegrown terrorists.103  In September 2010, Rezwan Ferdaus, a 26-
year-old Northeastern University physics graduate of Bangladeshi descent, planned to 
attack the Pentagon and Capitol building with remote-controlled planes measuring up to 
80 inches in length and capable of speeds greater than 100 miles per hour, guided by 
GPS, and containing five pounds each of plastic explosives.104  It is unlikely that the  
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planes would have had as much impact as Ferdaus desired, yet the case highlights the 
rapid diffusion of advanced technology to homegrown terrorists and the potential threat 
they pose.105 
2. Lower Aggression Threshold 
Exports of unmanned technology for partner-nations capacity building are 
creating long-term consequences of lowering the aggression threshold.  Experts agree that 
drones provide less military and political risk for lethal operations, which will lower the 
threshold for hostile actions by SANSA.106  U.S. exports provide partner nations 
capabilities to target their own enemies without international norms or guidelines for the 
use of these systems.  SANSA are learning from the successful precedent set by 
American, British, and Israeli drone strikes against threats to national interests.  These 
operations could affect relations between nation-states involved, but also destabilize 
entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. 
SANSA that acquire drones are able to conduct extraterritorial lethal operations 
following the American precedent.  As with Operation Nomad, Turkey currently benefits 
from American Predators conducting surveillance and gathering intelligence on PKK 
rebels, but it could begin arming its indigenous drones and conduct cross-border strikes 
into Iraq.  Turkey is a NATO ally and such operations risk pulling many other nations 
into a regional conflict.  China’s consideration to use an armed drone to strike cross 
border into Myanmar raise these issues again; what if it wanted to conduct a strike into 
South Korea or against a Taiwanese trawler in the South China sea? 
These events may become more prevalent as SANSA acquire drones without 
international norms that regulate lethal operations.  According to Micah Zenko, a security 
policy and drone expert at the Council of Foreign Relations, “We don’t like other states 
using lethal force outside their borders. It is destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider 
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escalation of violence between two states.”107  The diffusion of drones is not only about 
protecting American national interests, but it is becoming more about SANSA increasing 
ability to use lethal force outside of their borders. 
There is a difference in making the decision to deploy troops into a country and 
utilizing drones.  That is why unmanned aircraft currently account for 95 percent of 
American lethal operations.108  The decision to deploy a drone to collect needed 
intelligence and conduct a lethal strike is easier than invading a neighboring country.  If 
the U.S. did not have armed drones, it surely would not have conducted as many lethal 
strikes into Pakistan and Yemen as it has over the past decade.  If this precedent is true 
for the U.S., then it stands true for other SANSA that own and arm unmanned systems.  
Zenko agrees, arguing, “When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. 
practice, it will lower the threshold for use of lethal force outside their borders. So they 
will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past.”109 
3. Drone Counter-Measures 
Diffusion is fostering long-term consequences of SANSA developing drone 
counter-measures.  SANSA are attempting to exploit weaknesses in drone satellite links 
and remote controls that pilots utilize to fly the systems.  Whether it is Iranian military 
efforts to develop high-tech hacking software or al-Qaeda’s low-cost “tip-sheet,” 
adversaries are looking for ways to defeat the very weapons that have dominated the 
skies throughout the past decade. The veracity of some of counter-measures mentioned 
are unconfirmed but raise concern to the growing threat to drone operations.  As 
unmanned technology continues to evolve, so will the counters that American adversaries 
develop. 
A significant threat to American drones comes from reverse engineering.  Reverse 
engineering involves taking apart an aircraft to see how it works in order to copy, 
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enhance, or defeat the system.  Drones crash, whether mechanical failure or shot down, 
providing adversaries with opportunities to exploit recovered U.S. technology.110  
According to a database that tracks medium and long-range drone crashes, there are 
currently over 100 American and Israeli drone crashes that have occurred since January 
2007.111  The majority of these losses occurred in countries without western military 
presence: Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Yemen. 
In December 2011, Iran claims to have captured several American drones, most 
significantly the RQ-170 Sentinel.112  A primary American concern was that Iran might 
reverse engineer the radar-deflecting paint coating and special optics, perhaps with help 
from Russia and China.  It is unknown whether Iran did this, but Tehran claims to have 
copied the stealth technology and built its Epic drone along the lines of the Sentinel.113  
Reverse engineering the American stealth technology not only allows adversaries to 
enhance their own capabilities, but also provides opportunities to develop drone counter-
measures that will prove detrimental to the U.S. in future conflicts. 
Significant counter-measures include the threat of hacking, intercepting, or 
infecting the drone software.  “Spoofing” is a form of hacking that creates false GPS 
signals tricking the aircraft’s receiver, both time and location, into thinking everything is 
ok as hackers steer a new course.114  Spoofing allows hackers to take control of a drone 
and either crash or commandeer the system.  A recent demonstration by University of 
Texas at Austin, researchers is the first known demonstration that highlights spoofing is 
technically feasible.115  Using a small but sophisticated UAV along, with hardware and 
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software they developed, the research team repeatedly overtook navigational signals 
going to the GPS-guided vehicle. Although much easier to do on commercial GPS 
systems, experts claim that spoofing military GPS systems is a valid technique.116  
Adversaries are showing significant interest in hacking into drone software to steal or 
divert the aircraft. 
Iran is publically acknowledging concerns over American drones and voicing its 
interest in hacking them.  The state run news agency reported the introduction of high 
school curricula on bringing down foreign drones through hacking.117  Iranian officials 
claim expertise in “spoofing” and using this technique to down the American Sentinel 
mentioned earlier, but those claims are unconfirmed.118  It is unknown if Iran’s schools 
have the capability or technological expertise for such lessons.  However, this gives a 
clear sense of Iranian officials’ attitude and intentions toward American drones. 
Hacking builds on recent history of security flaws with American drones, from 
their unencrypted video feeds to their vulnerability to malware.  U.S. military officials 
discovered that insurgents in Iraq used the SkyGrabber, a downloadable program, to hack 
into video feeds from Predator drones.119  Iranian-backed groups intercepted satellite 
data; this allows them to view, record, and share video relayed by unmanned systems.  
This poses a significant risk as intercepted drone data could be used to spy on American 
bases and other troop locations. 
Infection of drone software is another threat that a hacker or someone with access 
to the systems can pose.  In March 2011, an unknown software glitch caused a Predator 
stationed at a U.S. base in Djibouti, Africa to start its engine without human direction.  
Technicians concluded that a software bug had infected the “brains” of the drone, but 
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never pinpointed the problem.120  Additionally, Air Force technicians discovered a virus 
infecting drone remote cockpits at Creech AFB, Nevada in October 2011.121  Malware 
had apparently made its way onto cockpit computers because someone used it to play the 
Mafia Wars video game.  It took weeks of sustained effort to clean up the machines.  
Hackers can exploit these vulnerabilities with cheap commercially available hardware 
and software. 
Non-state actors are also looking at exploiting drone weaknesses.  Since 2010, 
AQ has assigned cells of engineers to find ways to shoot down, jam, or remotely hack 
U.S. drones.122  They have recently become increasingly open about their desire to 
counter American drones.  In March 2013, AQ published an article titled “The Drone 
Chain” that not only reassures readers that jihadists are working on various techniques to 
hack, manipulate, and destroy drones; but asks for members to develop new counter-
measures and share throughout the network.123  AQ is apparently sponsoring work on 
GPS and infrared tag jamming amongst many high-tech counters. 
In the absence of high-tech counter-measures to drones, AQ is developing basic 
defensive counter-measures, with a 22-item “tip sheet.”  Their hope is to share 
knowledge and reduce the number of casualties across the network.  The Associated 
Press found a copy of the tip-sheet in Mali, left behind after recent fighting in 2012.124  
A Yemeni jihadist wrote the list two years earlier and had been circulating it among AQ 
franchises since then.  The tip sheet advises militants to hide under thick trees, stay in the 
shadows, cover up their vehicles, stay away from their parked cars, hold meetings 
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indoors, and avoid using cell phones.  If they hear a drone approaching, they are advised 
to scatter in multiple directions or set up dummies as decoys. 
Finally, Stealth Wear is developing a new clothing line that advertises anti-drone 
capabilities.  The clothing line includes hoodies, scarves, hats, and t-shirts advertised to 
make individuals invisible to thermal imaging cameras widely used throughout the drone 
community.125  This line includes additional garments that will protect from x-ray 
machines and anti-phone pockets that allow users to zero out phone’s signal.  Terrorist 
can now remain stylish while hiding from drone thermal imagers.  The capability of the 
clothing line is unconfirmed; however, coupled with the counter-measures from the al-
Qaeda tip sheet, it would increase the effectiveness against drone sensors. 
After the reviewing the previously mentioned short-term benefits compared with 
the long-term consequences, this analysis concludes that American diffusion myopia is 
indeed threatening global security as technology outpaces regulations.  The desire of 
drone industry officials to remain competitive in a growing global market is affecting the 
MTCR and Wassenaar agreements.  Administration officials are considering reducing 
restrictions on exports to build partner nation capacity and expand research and develop.  
Weakening the agreements will allow for adversarial nations to not only acquire their 
own systems, lowering the aggression threshold, but it allows them to develop drone 
counter-measures that jeopardizes the American program. 
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III. ETHICAL AND LEGAL MYOPIA  
These [drone] strikes are legal, they are ethical and they are wise.  
James Carney, White House Press Secretary, 2013126 
A. OPERATIONS OUTPACING POLICY 
As unmanned technology diffuses to SANSA, the U.S. faces an increasing threat 
from ethically and legally myopic drone policies.  As critics and advocates debate 
legalities and their ethical use as weapons of war, administration officials continue to 
conduct lethal operations.  The U.S. currently wages war not against an established 
nation-state, but against transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, which have no 
embassies, no recognized government, and no legitimate political representation 
anywhere in the world.  Undoubtedly, drones have killed large numbers of militants 
across the globe and reduced AQ’s ability to attack the American homeland.  Yet, the 
lack of transparent national policy sets a dangerous precedent for SANSA to use drones 
inconsistent with American interests. 
America is one of the world’s leading democracies.  However, past 
administrations adopted a foreign policy that relies on its “classified” drone program, 
which is sparingly discussed by administration officials and has been framed on legal 
advice never properly explained.  The Obama administration uses its executive power to 
refuse or ignore requests by Congressional inquiries and resists monitoring by federal 
courts.127  What makes drones so dangerous is the lethality and efficiency diffusing in a 
global environment, which lacks internationally accepted norms on ethical and legal 
drone use.  The U.S. continues using drones in the short-term to target “imminent” threats 
to national security with “classified” reasoning, which administration officials are 
unlikely to endorse in the long-term for other SANSA. 
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Facing the possibility of not winning a second term in 2012, the Obama 
administration made a concerted effort to codify drone use for future administrations.  
The “Drone Rulebook” was to provide new presidents explicit ethical and legal rules for 
lethal drone operations.128  Obama stated:  
One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and 
we need Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only 
am I reined in but any president is reined in terms of some of the decisions 
that we’re making.129   
However, as elections finished so did the hopes of codifying a long-term American 
policy. 
In 2013, under increasing public and congressional pressures, administration 
officials released the DOJ “white paper” in February and Obama gave a major drone 
policy speech in May at the National Defense University (NDU).  The DOJ white paper 
outlined legal guidelines for the administration’s lethal operations, specifically that 
targets must present an imminent threat, capture must be infeasible; and the killing 
carried out according to fundamental principles of the laws of war governing the use of 
force: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity.130  However, the memo’s 
vagueness of key terms, such as imminent, sets global precedents for other SANSA 
program justification.  This document added little new substance to what administration 
officials had already publically proclaimed about legalities of American drone policy. 
Obama’s May 2013 speech to students at NDU outlined the administrations 
desires to codify drone operations framed using traditional just war theory (JWT).  The 
president stated American lethal drone operations are just, proportional, in last resort, and 
in self-defense.131  He understands the need to restrain the power drones provide, or 
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SANSA may abuse the capabilities.  Prior to the speech, Obama signed a presidential 
policy guidance that seeks to set guidelines for future policy.  The intent is for this policy 
to guide international norms and regulations for future use of unmanned systems.  
However, the Obama administration has yet to codify a national drone policy.  
American myopia is creating two distinct issues for future use of drones.  The first 
issue pertains to the lack of ethical justifications.  In the short-term, traditional JWT 
provides American officials the ability to conduct lethal operations with drones to defend 
the nation from unjust threats.132  If administration officials meets the criteria for going 
to war (jus ad bellum), the use of drones is morally feasible in pursuit of a just cause.  
However, in the long-term, SANSA may deem a perceived threat a just cause, but may 
not meet all ad bellum criteria.  The lack of transparent ethical justifications to use drones 
for lethal operations creates a murky standard that other SANSA will follow.  As 
America finds itself entangled with a global network of non-state actors and nations that 
sponsor them, it is imperative to seek clearer ethical justifications in order to guide 
formation of national drone policy. 
The second myopic issue involves the American legal framework based on the 
authorization for the use of military force (AUMF).  The U.S. government legally argues 
that the nation is engaged in a war with AQ and its affiliates.133  In the short-term, the 
“global” war and the authorities provided in the AUMF enables drones as legal tools to 
conduct lethal operations against “imminent” threats.  Yet, in the long-term, there are 
dangers of creating international “blowback” from lethal operations.  Not only are there 
innocent civilians being killed, but there are others that seek to fight the U.S. because of 
strikes that have damaged their property or killed family members.  The consequences of 
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these strikes may have a long-term effect on American global standings and will again 
create a precedent for other SANSA as they seek to use drones for similar purposes. 
The following is an examination of the short-term benefits and the long-term 
consequences of the issues listed above to determine if American strategy is ethically and 
legal myopic to determine the extent of threat posed to national interests. 
B. SHORT-TERM BENEFITS 
1. Self-defense 
The JWT provides ethical guidelines for American use of drones in self-defense, 
as decision-makers remain morally obligated to protect soldiers from unnecessary risk.  
Against a just cause, drones provide ethically feasible tools and capabilities to limit 
terrorists’ safe havens while defending American troops and the homeland.  CIA Director 
John Brennan has stated that American drone use is, “consistent with the inherent right of 
self-defense.”134  The JWT serves as the basis for the laws and policies that govern how 
modern nations enter into conflict and wage war.  
The JWT is the oldest and most respected gauge to determine if decisions made in 
wars and armed conflicts are ethical, benefiting from centuries of philosophical review 
and development.135  The theory is traditionally divided into three separate concepts for 
ethical decisions made in war: jus ad bellum (rightness of starting a war), jus in bello 
(rightness of fighting in war), and jus post bellum (rightness of behavior after a war).  Jus 
in bello frames the conduct in war, specifically the means of war.  These means include, 
but are not limited to, the weapons used, the effects the weapons cause, and the tactics 
and strategies adversaries wage combat.136  The principles of jus in bello deem weapons 
morally permissible if they are necessary, proportional to attacks, discriminate against  
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targets, and respect the immunity of innocent civilians.  President Obama has proclaimed 
that the American drone operations are just, proportionally waged, and used only in self-
defense.137 
Drones remain a tool of American arsenal to use in defense of the nation.  Moral 
responsibility falls on the agents, American officials, using these tools not the tools 
themselves.138  The individuals that use drones are subject to moral judgment for the 
immoral actions they conduct with drones.  If the cause is just and operators apply 
justificatory burdens of discrimination and proportionality, then utilizing these tools is 
justified.  In principle, the U.S. remains ethically justified to use drones in self-defense 
for a just cause, and can even be morally obligated to use them under certain 
conditions.139  Adherence to the JWT provides guidelines for the framing of laws that 
govern weapon use in combat and will not only frame American policy, but also 
international norms for the future use of drones. 
2. Lethal Operations 
Lethal drone operations provide the short-term benefit of monitoring and 
eliminating threats to national interest.  As highlighted earlier, the authorization for the 
use of military force (AUMF) and DOJ white paper provide the publically acknowledged 
authorities to conduct lethal drone operations.  These legal precedents provide the U.S 
with guides to conduct a “global” war against AQ and its affiliates.  Lethal drone 
operations have drawn considerable debate about the legal authorities for conducting 
such operations.  These lethal operations have various names, including personality or 
signature strikes (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Definition of Personality and Signature Strikes140 
Whatever term used, American lethal drone operations are setting international 
standards for dealing with threats.  On August 9, 2013, Israel utilized a drone to conduct 
a lethal strike in Sinai airspace, long known for using lethal drone operations in Gaza or 
Lebanon; this was the first strike outside these areas.  The strike, approved by Egyptian 
officials, killed five militants that were preparing to launch a rocket into Israel.141  The 
Sinai is a safe-haven for militants that use the area for smuggling and other criminal 
activities, specifically cross-border attacks into Israel.142  In another incident, on April 
30, 2013, British military conducted its first remote drone strike, carried out from 
Lincolnshire, striking a target more than 3,000 miles away in Afghanistan.143  Similar 
lethal cross-border operations will continue as additional SANSA acquire advance 
unmanned technology and mirror the precedence set by the U.S., Britain, and Israel. 
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The effectiveness of lethal operations is debatable, but several factors highlight 
why the U.S. continues to use drones despite long-term consequences.  First, strikes are 
creating tension within the terrorist networks by eliminating leaders, planners, and 
experienced technical operators (bomb makers).  This has a lasting effect on the network 
through the replacement of key members by new and less experienced militants.  The 
impact of the strikes is evident from the actions of militants in the FATA.  They regularly 
complain to Pakistani officials in attempts to intimidate them into stopping support of 
American drone operations, simultaneously murdering local tribal leaders who they 
suspect of being spies for CIA and Pakistani intelligence.144  These actions not only 
highlight growing paranoia in the FATA dark networks, but also serve as an alienating 
device for locals whom are even more tempted to inform the authorities. 
Second, drones are killing more high-value targets than civilians.  Although 
collateral damage does occur, drones kill a lower ratio of civilians to combatants than 
seen in any recent war.145  Accurate civilian casualty estimates are difficult to obtain, but 
estimates of Afghani civilian deaths in 2011 alone (1,462) eclipse the past 11 years of 
civilian deaths from drones (996).146  Conventional air power and bombs are far less 
accurate and likely to cause more civilian causalities.  Additionally, there is no guarantee 
that boots on the ground will not cause innocent civilians deaths leading to further danger 
to the troops (see Table 4).  Drone strikes appear to be a better option to limiting civilian 
casualties than other options.147  President Obama highlights the fact that a lack of an  
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U.S. drone program would invite far more civilian casualties.148  Terrorists remain 
committed to targeting civilian populations and death tolls from their attacks are greater 
than drone estimates. 
 
Table 4.   Civilian Death Rates in Comparative Campaigns149 
Additional proponents argue the effectiveness of drones and the limited number 
of civilian casualties.  Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down, uses the previously 
mentioned four drone databases to show limited numbers of deaths within a 19-month 
period.150  Taking the highest estimates between January 2012 and July 2013, Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) shows there were approximately 65 drone strikes in 
Pakistan, which it estimates to have killed a minimum of 308 people, four being civilians, 
amounting to a civilian casualty rate of less than 1.5 percent.151  This means that only one 
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U.S. Drone Operations 
in FATA 2004 - 2013 
(Avg 4 databases) 2649 241 9.09
Nondrone U.S. 
Operations in FATA 
2011 32 12 37.5
Pakistani Army 
Operations in FATA 
2002 - 2007 1440 451 31.31
Israeli Targeted Killings 
2000 - 2011 427 175 40.98
Estimated World 
Combat Average for 
the 1990s N/A N/A 88.89
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in 65 casualties occurred by drones strikes during this period were civilian; this speaks to 
drones effective discrimination between civilian and military targets that no other 
weapons system can possibly match.152 
Additionally, Afghan President Hamid Karzai provided another indication that 
drones cause less civilian causality than traditional warfare.  In 2011, the U.S. was 
employing all types of units in Afghanistan, ground troops, airstrikes, artillery, and 
drones.  However, the source of friction with the Afghan government was not drones but 
rather Special Forces night raids, which Karzai proclaimed he would withhold further 
cooperation until his government obtained greater control over night raids.153  American 
drone use did not cause him or the Afghan people any significant concern.154 
Third, lethal drone operations have taken away the initiative from AQ and its 
affiliates as they are losing sanctuary to plan, rehearse, and train for attacks.  AQ 
members are more worried now about death by drones and developing counter-measures 
than plotting against America (see Chapter II).  AQ leader’s ability to communicate is 
degraded.  Due to concerns of spies on the ground and in the air, limiting use of phones 
and radios, leaders have to rely on slower forms of communications such as couriers.155  
The inability to communicate adequately across the network, train, and plan attacks is 
further degrading abilities to conduct attacks. 
Fourth, drones are morally cost-effective for operators.  Operators receive lethal 
orders like any service member involved in combat operations, yet remain at a safe 
distance from combat.  Operators do not have to deal with moral and ethical situations on 
a daily basis as do soldiers on the ground.  Lawful orders direct operators to conduct 
kinetic operations, while operators maintain the ability to not launch or change direction 
of missile if the situation changes.  Standard operating procedures (SOP) ensure that split 
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second decisions are morally easier for operators, taking them out of the equation unless 
there is a last-minute change.  The decisions to launch a missile from a manned or 
unmanned aircraft are similar, except drone pilots are located in safe locations away from 
harm.  Decision-makers at the highest level of command make the recommendations to 
conduct lethal strikes, not the operator. 
Finally, American lethal drone operations provide the opportunity to work with 
and through partner nations to disrupt dark networks.  Critics argue that drone operations 
violate the sovereignty of nations, but this is far from the truth as recently highlighted in 
the Abbottabad Commission Report.  The U.S. actively coordinates and conducts lethal 
operations with the knowledge and consent of the states, despite nation’s public denial 
due to political sensitivities.156  The majority of these governments attempt to hide its 
role in the U.S. drone program due to domestic political issues, but behind the scenes 
these government leaders continue to allow the drones strikes.  This is a critical point in 
American myopia, as it justifies its use by receiving the consent of nations that share a 
common enemy and lack the capabilities to target the networks.  As the U.S. expands its 
drone bases, it is apparent that other governments are complicit in U.S. drone use in their 
countries. 
C. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES 
1. Adversarial Justification 
The lack of a transparent legal justification creates long-term consequences that 
threaten the international community.  The most significant is SANSA reasoning to use 
the same ethical and legal justifications for its own programs.  Circumventing 
international human rights law for capturing targets when possible encourages SANSA to 
declare their own “global war” to target “imminent” threats.  These arbitrary 
declarations,” when no such conflict exists, allows SANSA to kill at will.  This is already  
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happening as highlighted earlier (Chapter I) with the China desire to target a drug lord in 
Myanmar, and it is only a matter of time before non-state actors have similar capabilities 
and intentions.  
The AUMF provides American legal justification for lethal drone operations, 
while the DOJ “white paper” lays out general guidelines.  These documents authorize the 
United States to conduct lethal drone operations when an individual poses an “imminent 
threat,” capture is infeasible, and is consistent with the four fundamental of laws of war—
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity.157  Created after the 9/11 attacks, 
these authorizations allowed for short-term targeting operations yet are now outdated as 
the threat and political environment is evolving.  This legal framework provides the U.S. 
ability to continue to use drones, but is myopic in that it fails to account for the SANSA 
acquisition of similar capabilities and intentions. 
There are no international recognized laws that govern the use of drones.  U.S. 
legal justification for its use of drones relies on a “global war” concept that treats the 
entire world as a battlefield.  President Obama’s policy guidance highlights the need for 
transparency and the requirement to limit drone use.158  However, the lack of regulation 
of drone use sets a dangerous precedent as other SANSA develop similar drone 
programs.  The U.S. lacks concerted efforts to address long-term legal consequences 
while reaping short-term benefits already discussed.  Its classified legal justification does 
not provide legal direction for other SANSA programs. 
The lack of international law governing drones is already creating additional long-
term consequences as adversaries acquire systems.  International Human Rights Laws 
(IHRL) or the Law of Armed Conflict advocates transparent development of laws, which 
will regulate future use of these systems.  Human Rights First legal director Dixon 
Osburn welcomed the White House’s pledge for more transparency but remained “deeply 
concerned that the administration appears to be institutionalizing a problematic targeted 
                                                 
157 Amnesty International, “The Devil in the (Still Undisclosed) Details: Department of Justice ‘White 
Paper’ on use of Lethal Force against U.S. Citizens Made Public,” Amnesty International Library, February 
2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/006/2013/en/0ac105b2-c558-4892-9bce-
e80c97113bf9/amr510062013en.pdf. 
158 Roberts, “Obama Restricts Drone Killing,” 2013. 
 50 
killing policy without public debate on whether the rules are lawful or appropriate.159  
Public debate will bring the capabilities and dangers of drones to the foreground for 
framing of international laws.  Additionally, lack of transparency lessens the credibility 
of the nation as an advocate of human rights.  This sets a dangerous precedent that other 
SANSA will use to avoid responsibility for their programs of targeted killing.  If 
American legal myopia remains unchecked, there is a risk that lethal drone operations 
will weaken the international framework for protection of human rights. 
The use of drones against an imminent threat is morally sound in principle and 
sometimes even in practice, but the abuse or misuse of lethal operations by SANSA pose 
the gravest threat to the international community.  Without the transparency of its 
program, the U.S. is creating long-term consequences as SANSA seek to eliminate 
threats to their interests.  The primary moral issue for lethal drone operations is the 
measuring, evaluation, and understanding of what constitutes an “imminent threat.”160  
American lack of transparency and definition of imminence provides SANSA a precedent 
to use drones for an otherwise unjust cause.  The DOJ white paper and AUMF do not 
provide an adequate definition to frame international norms, leading SANSA to conduct 
drone strikes against a target that is not posing an imminent threat, hence not liable, and 
falsely claimed as defensive.  Strawser argues that while some drone strikes have met the 
proper threshold for imminent threat, others have not.161  Without transparency of data 
used for such operations, there is no proper way to know what is correct.  These norms 
create a dangerous precedent for future drone use. 
2. Blow Back 
AUMF legally authorizes lethal drone operations, yet collateral damage is causing 
long-term blow back for America and the international community.  U.S. reliance on 
drone strikes allows adversaries to cast America as a distant, high-tech, amoral death 
dealer.  Lethal drone operations are building resentment, facilitating terrorist recruitment, 
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and alienating those we seek to protect.  Drone strikes may degrade terrorist networks, 
but they may also create more problems than they solve.162  The “global war” concept, 
discussed earlier, provides legal justification for continued use of drones, yet the strategy 
fails to consider long-term consequence of how civilians in these nations feel about living 
under constant threat of drone strikes. 
Drones cause feelings of resentment amongst civilians that live under the threat 
they pose.  General Stanley McChrystal, former Commander of NATO forces in 
Afghanistan, stated there is a “visceral hatred against Americans and the use of drones for 
lethal targeting.”163  Drones primarily operate over denied or restricted areas where the 
military has few “boots on the ground.”  This creates a significant long-term challenge to 
investigate civilian harm and making amends for suffering or losses.164  Gul Nawaz, a 
Pakistani civilian, lost his family of 11 and house from an errant drone strike.165  He fails 
to understand morally how this is justified, while his claims for clarification go 
unanswered, along with numerous others. 
The perception that the U.S. continues to kill large number of civilians is 
outraging civilians in countries like Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan.  The hope is that 
more transparency will help calm the dissent against American drone strikes.  Many 
people inside and outside the government have argued for far greater candor about all of 
the strikes, saying excessive secrecy has prevented public debate in Congress or a full 
explanation of their rationale.  Experts say lethal operations are deeply unpopular, in part 
due to allegations of large numbers of civilian casualties, which American officials say 
are exaggerated.166  The results of a July 2009 Gallup poll showed that only nine percent 
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of 2,500 Pakistanis interviewed supported the use of drones.167  Additionally, a May 
2010 poll carried out by the Regional Institute for Policy Research and Training reported 
that in the Swat Valley, which Taliban briefly controlled before a major military 
operation in 2009, showed 67 per cent of 384 people felt the drone attacks “provoked” 
the families of those killed.168  These polls highlight the lack of support amongst the 
population for continued drone operations. 
Militants take advantage of American lack of transparency and accurate data on 
strikes to frame global perceptions.  Open source data provides the best information 
available to monitor these strikes, primarily from host nation officials, locals, and 
militants.  Militants that have access to strike areas react quickly to take full advantage of 
the strike in the media.  They quickly cordon off the scene to prevent anyone, even local 
from gaining access to the area.  This limits accurate information on the number of 
civilians versus militants killed, which numbers are using exaggerated in favor of 
militants propaganda efforts.  The lack of available data about the strikes are creating 
public blow back that governments must deal with. 
In addition to resentment, drones are also facilitating terrorist recruitment.  The 
perceived high level of civilian deaths allow jihadist to shape perceptions of American 
drones.  Despite the internal logic of “signature strikes” and the relative precision of 
“personality strikes,” there can be no doubt that lethal drone operations have killed 
innocent victims enhancing already existing resentment.169  Drone strikes constitute a 
strong source of outrage and a catalyst of recruitment among radicalized jihadists already 
living in the U.S. and overseas.  Security experts believe that drone strikes have replaced 
the prison in Guantanamo Bay as the main recruitment instrument for young jihadists.170 
There are numerous examples of jihadists using American strikes for justification 
to conduct attacks.  Unable to target the U.S., Pakistani jihadists target government and 
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civilians on the basis that the government allows American attacks in the FATA.  
Additionally, both Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, and AQ claim 
responsibility for the suicide bombing at the CIA base in Eastern Afghanistan in 2009 for 
retribution of drone strikes.171  In May 2010, after Faisal Shahzad attempted a car 
bombing in New York’s Times Square, TTP claimed responsibility through a video 
statement stating it was revenge for the “recent rain of drone attacks in the tribal areas” 
and other perceived U.S. crimes.172  Additionally, in Yemen, AQAP uses similar 
arguments for attacks against the government and America.  The attempted bombing of 
an airline over Detroit on December 25, 2009 was in retaliation for alleged drone strikes 
carried out by U.S. in Yemen on December 14, 2009.173  These strikes will continue to 
pose a long-term threat to the U.S. due to lack of transparency on its strategy of lethal 
operations. 
The risk of the U.S. creating more enemies from lethal operations is ongoing, but 
this threat may increase in the long-term when other SANSA begin to acquire offensive 
drones.  With less stringent methods to limit drone strikes, SANSA will create even more 
enemies as they target adversaries in other nations.  Tensions will increase within 
societies, as members feel threatened from the new technology and SANSA malign 
intentions and use of the systems.  The offensive uses of drones will create fear and anger 
in many nations’ societies. 
After the reviewing the previously mentioned short-term benefits compared with 
the long-term consequences, this analysis concludes that American ethical and legal 
myopia is indeed threatening global security as operations outpaces policy.  The U.S. 
administration remains myopically focused on the killing of terrorists that threaten 
national interests, yet fails to appreciate adequately the long-term ethical consequences 
associated with these operations.  Whether killed or not, the threat to civilians remains as 
                                                 
171 Zahid Hussain, “Attacker of CIA is Linked to Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126305287870523271.html. 
172 Aaron Katersky, “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Time Square Car Bomb Plot, Warns of More 
Attacks,” World News, June 21, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/faisal-shahzad-pleads-guilty-times-
square-car-bomb/story?id=10970094. 
173 Sloggett, “The Utility of Using UAVs,” 2010. 
 54 
drones are far from perfect in their targeting, as the president actually acknowledged in 
his May 2013 speech.174  If the U.S. does not codify the use of drones ethically, it may 
undermine the moral standings of the nation.175  However, the concern is that by creating 
resentment and facilitating terrorist recruiting, drones do more harm in the long-term, 
even if they do some good in the short-term. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
American strategic myopia is fostering a dangerous international precedent for 
future SANSA use of drones, as technology outpaces regulations and American 
operations outpaces policy.  Myopic strategies are framing domestic and international 
legal precedents that fail to account for long-term consequences.  This creates a future 
geopolitical environment that will see more aggression against adversaries armed with 
drones.  The recent presidential policy guidance is a step forward to codify drone 
operations, but may be too late to change the international precedent already set by 
America. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, The United States should develop a transparent national policy toward 
drones.  This policy should create mechanisms to assess the lawfulness of lethal 
operations, account for any strikes considered unjust, and compensate victims and their 
families.  U.S. and international law do not expressly forbid lethal operation, but 
American lack of clear drone policy brings this practice into question.  American 
practices are not only providing SANSA with clear justification for their programs, but 
are also perpetuating blowback from civilian populations living under fear of drone 
strikes and their governments.  Without a transparent policy, SANSA are apt to mirror 
American precedents when creating their programs. 
The U.S. government should develop a transparent drone policy based on 
President Obama’s speech given at NDU in May 2013.  He made it clear, “the use of 
force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot 
make us safe.  We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in 
the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war.”176  
There needs to be an expanded effort to explain how drones fit into the overall American 
counter-terrorism strategy, including what appropriate ethical justifications and legal 
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framework govern American lethal operations.  Yet, force alone will not quell the threats 
of today; drone use must be part of a larger strategy and not seen as the only tool America 
possess to combat terrorism.  Since the attacks of 9/11 and creation of the AUMF, global 
political and security concerns continue to evolve and so too should the requirement for 
lethal operations. 
Second, the U.S. should create an external court, or court-like entity, that serves 
as a mechanism providing oversight on lethal drones operations.  A “drone court” could 
review classified intelligence related to each drone strike and make a decision if the target 
meets an “imminent” threshold.  Former Congresswoman Jane Harman has led the call 
for such a process, building upon the existing framework found in the FISA-courts 
system.177  The court could follow specific criteria to determine if the threat is imminent, 
feasibility of capture, and consistency with international laws; similar to the current 
judiciary court and warrant system followed in the U.S. and now followed in warrant 
based targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Such a court adds a time consuming step in 
lethal operations process, but sets the international precedent for the need of checks and 
balances regarding lethal operations.178  Alternatively, during time sensitive operations, 
agencies involved may maintain discretion for operational security, while afterward a 
drone court can conduct a review of the operation to enforce accountability amongst 
decision makers making wrong or unjust decisions.  This sets an international precedent 
that the U.S. is not allowing a single individual to decide unilaterally who needs to die by 
drone. 
Third, the U.S. should strengthen the MTCR and Wassenaar agreements.  
Diffusion of drones has become a threat to global security, as the feasibility of indigenous 
production increases and opportunities for acquiring complete unmanned systems 
emerge.  The U.S. needs to improve export information databases and communications 
between licensing departments and intelligence agencies.179  Despite attempts to limit 
drone diffusion, there remains no formal mechanism for government agencies to share 
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intelligence information that aid in export licensing decisions.  The creation of an 
interagency export control group will provide necessary intelligence to all decision-
makers, allowing exports license decision based on relevant and accurate intelligence.  
Additionally, the U.S. government does not have an aggregate export database that tracks 
drone exports.180  Each agency’s database categorizes drones differently, which impairs 
the U.S. governments’ ability to conduct end-use monitoring.  Partner nations and other 
SANSA malign use of drones may go unchecked.  Better sharing of intelligence will 
ensure that all administration officials understand the long-term consequences of drone 
diffusion. 
These two agreements lack the international authority to enforce the limitations of 
drone exports by foreign nations.  Thus far, both of these non-binding agreements are 
ineffective at limiting the diffusion of drones. The U.S. must work with the international 
community to strengthen both agreements.  The MTCR conducts annual meetings and 
members must stop further attempts to relax the current controls that already exist.181  
Rather, efforts must strengthen the MTCR with mechanisms to punish nations conducting 
exports of dual-use technologies or complete systems.  Without mechanisms to punish 
violators, these agreements will remain non-binding and inconsequential to reducing 
diffusion.  Fortunately, the drone threat has not completely matured yet, as SANSA 
primarily only have limited tactical UAVs, giving the U.S. time to develop controls that 
will limit future exports of complete systems and dual-use technologies.  The MTCR can 
become the United States’ best hope to contain and manage the drone threat. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Drones are here to stay.  Successful American use of unmanned systems is 
ushering in a new era of drone warfare, as SANSA seek similar capabilities to combat 
perceived threats to their countries or networks.  American lessening of export controls 
and lack of a transparent national drone policy is fostering dangerous international 
precedent.  Although drones provide short-term benefits, tempering them through strict 
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export controls, in coordination with ethical and legal policies, may help to ensure long-
term consequences will not endanger future regional or global security.  American 
myopic drone strategies are fostering a dangerous precedent for SANSA to follow as they 
develop and deploy their own lethal drones. 
Not all may be lost though.  As the U.S. embarks on its comprehensive review of 
unmanned technology and looks to codify national policy, decision-makers may take into 
account the long-term consequences of these systems.  The administration’s codification 
of a clear drone policy can create standards and practices that are defensible domestically 
and internationally, especially as SANSA develop unmanned programs.  Only through 
open dialogue and transparent ethical discourse can administration officials create such a 
policy.  Now is the time for American officials to develop a national drone policy to set 
conditions for future drone use.  Without a transparent policy, the United States risks 
setting a dangerous precedent that SANSA will use to justify their own drone programs. 
 59 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Al Jazeera. “Pakistan: State of the Nation.” Al Jazeera-Gallup Pakistan Survey. August 
13, 2009. http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/08/2009888238994769.html#top. 
Anderson, Brain. “North Korea is testing a Fleet of Killer Drones.” Motherboard (blog). 
March 20, 2013. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/north-korea-is-testing-a-fleet-
of-killer-drones. 
Ansari, Neha. “Drones Not A Violation of Our Sovereignty.” The International Herald 
Tribune. July 23, 2013. http://tribune.com.pk/story/580923/drones-not-a-
violation-of-our-sovereignty/. 




Beckhausen, Robert. “Iranian Missile Engineer Oversees Chavez’s Drones.” Wired. 
Danger Room. June 18, 2012. 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/mystery-cargo/. 
Benson, Pam. “Bin Laden documents: Fear of Drones.” CNN Security Clearance (blog). 
May 3, 2012. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/03/bin-laden-documents-fear-
of-drones/. 




Bodeen, Christopher. “China Emerging as New Force in Drone Warfare.” Santa Cruz 
Sentinel. May 3, 2013. http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/ci_23163525/china-
emerging-new-force-drone-warfare?IADID=Search-www.santacruzsentinel.com-
www.santacruzsentinel.com. 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Covert Wars on Terror: The Data Sets. Last 
modified August 1, 2013. Accessed September 3, 2013. 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/obama-2013-pakistan-drone-
strikes/.  
Byman, Daniel. “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice.” 




Carney, James. “Carney: Drone Strikes ‘Legal,’ ‘Ethical,’ ‘Wise.’” Washington Free 
Beacon. February 5, 2013. http://freebeacon.com/carney-drone-strikes-legal-
ethical-wise/. 
CBC News. “UN Embraces Drone Technology over Congo.” Reuters. July 14, 2013. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/07/14/wd-un-drones-congo.html. 
Censer, Marjorie. “Pentagon Buying Official Forecasts Much Tougher 2014 for Defense 




Cole, Chris. “First British Drone Strike Carried Out from the UK RAF Waddington.” 
Drone Wars UK. June 1, 2013. http://dronewars.net/2013/05/01/first-british-
drone-strike-carried-out-from-uk-raf-waddington/. 
———. “Industry lobbying to change drone export control rules.” Drone Wars UK. 
November 11, 2011. http://dronewars.net/2011/11/28/industry-lobbying-to-
change-drone-export-control-rules/. 
———. “Mapping Drone Proliferation: Big Business vs. MTCR.” Drone Wars UK. 
September 18, 2012. http://dronewars.net/2012/09/18/mapping-drone-
proliferation-big-business-vs-the-mtcr/. 
Dareini, Ali Akbar. “Iran Drones Reached Israel by the Dozens.” Huffington Post. 
October 16, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/16/iran-drones-
israel_n_1970868.html. 
Defense Science Board. The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems. Washington, DC: Office 
of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2012. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/AutonomyReport.pdf. 
DeRouen, Karl Jr. and Alex Mintz. Biases in Decision Making: Understanding Foreign 
Policy Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
Dowd, Alan W. “Drone Wars: Risk and Warnings.” Parameters, US Army War College 
Quarterly 42, no. 1 (winter–spring 2013). 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSprin
g_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf. 
Drone Wars UK. Drone Crash Database. Last modified October 12, 2013. Accessed 
October 24, 2013. http://dronewars.net/drone-crash-database/. 
 
 61 
Easton, Ian M. and L. C. Russell Hsiao. “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational 
Capabilities.” Project 2049 Institute. March 11, 2013. 
http://project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf. 
Egozi, Arie. “Will the Real UAV Revolution Begin in Poland.” Israeli Defense. August 
27, 2012. http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=472&ArticleID=1605. 
Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “GPS Hijacking Catches Feds, Drone Makers off 
Guard.” Wired. July 19, 2012. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/07/drone-
gps-spoof/. 
Friedersdorf, Conor. “CNN’s Bogus Drone-Deaths Graph.” The Atlantic. July 6, 2012. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/cnns-bogus-drone-deaths-
graphic/259493/. 
Gallo, William. “Chinese Drone Technology Advancing Rapidly.” Voice of America. 
December 19, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/content/analysts-chinese-drone-
technology-advancing-rapidly/1567739.html. 
Gaylord, Chris. “SkyGrabber: Is Hacking Military Drones too Easy?” Christian Science 
Monitor. December 17, 2009. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons/2009/1217/SkyGrabber-Is-
hacking-military-drones-too-easy. 
Gertler, Jeremiah. U.S. Unmanned Aerial System. CRS RL42136. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2012. 
Ghazi, Siavosh. “Iran Unveils New Attack Drone.” Yahoo News. May 9, 2013. 
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/iran-unveils-attack-drone-190842909.html#s9lMmDx. 
Goldenberg, Tia. “Israel Leads Global Drone Exports as Demand Grows.” The Times of 
Israel. July 21, 2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-leads-global-drone-
exports-as-demand-grows/. 
Goodman, Marc. “Attack of the Drones: The Dangers of Remote-Controlled Aircraft.” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review. December 16, 2011. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&Ite
mId=+++1196343&Pubabbrev=JIR. 
Hallgrath, Matthew W. “Just War Theory and Remote Military Technology: A Primer,” 
in Killing by Remote Control, edited by Bradley J. Strawser, 25–46. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
 62 
Holewinski, Sarah. Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Cost, Unanswered 
Questions. New York: Center for Civilians in Conflict and Human Rights Clinic, 
Columbia Law School, 2012. 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-
institute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf. 
Holmes, Matthew B. “Just War and Applicability to Targeted Killing.” Master’s thesis, 
Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. 
Humphreys, Todd. “Cockrell School Researchers Demonstrate First Successful 
‘Spoofing’ of Drones.” University of Texas, Austin. June 27, 2012. 
http://www.engr.utexas.edu/features/humphreysspoofing. 
Hussain, Zahid. “Attacker of CIA is linked to Taliban.” Wall Street Journal. January 11, 
2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126305287870523271.html. 
Ingersoll, Gregory. “Check out This Drone-Proof Counter Surveillance Clothing.” 
Business Insider. January 9, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/check-out-
this-drone-proof-counter-surveillance-clothing-2013-1. 
Isikoff, Michael. “Justice Department Memo: It’s Legal to Use Drone Strikes against 
Americans.” MSNBC. February 4, 2013. 
http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/04/exclusive-justice-department-memo-reveals-
legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans/. 
Jakes, Lara. “Obama to address Drones, Gitmo in Security Speech.” Associated Press. 
May 22, 2013. http://news.yahoo.com/obama-address-drones-gitmo-security-
speech-102600910.html. 
Katersky, Aaron. “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Time Square Car Bomb Plot, Warns 
of More Attacks.” World News. June 21, 2010. 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/faisal-shahzad-pleads-guilty-times-square-car-
bomb/story?id=10970094. 
Lennard, Natasha. “Iran High Schools to Teach Drone Hacking.” Salon. August 19, 2013. 
http://www.salon.com/2013/08/19/iran_high_schools_to_teach_drone_hacking/. 
Levitt, Theodore. “Marketing Myopia.” Harvard Business Review 38 (July−August 
1960): 57−56. 
Lewis, Michael W. “Drones: Actually the Most Humane Form of Warfare Ever.” The 




MacAskill, Ewen. “Iran Claims to Have Reversed-Engineered US Spy Drone.” The 
Guardian. April 22, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/22/iran-
reverse-engineer-spy-drone. 
McConnell, Dugald and Brian Todd. “Militant Tipsheet: How to Avoid a Drone Strike.” 
CNN. February 23, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/22/world/meast/drone-
dodging/index.html?hpt=hp_t2. 
Melito, Thomas. Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information and End-Use 
Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports. GAO-12-536, 2012. 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536. 
Meyer, John. “How Israel Became the Worldwide Leader in Drones.” The Atlantic Wire. 
July 10, 2013. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/07/how-israel-
became-worldwide-leader-drones/67050/. 
Michaels, Jim. “Experts: Drones Basis for New Global Arms Race.” USA Today. January 
9, 2013. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-UAS-
basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/. 
Missile Technology Control Regime. “Frequently Asked Questions.” Accessed August 
13, 2013. http://www.mtcr.info/english/FAQ-E.html. 
National Museum of the U.S. Air Force. “Kettering Aerial Torpedo ‘Bug.’” March 21, 
2007. http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=320. 
New America Foundation. Pakistani Drone Analysis. Last modified July 31, 2013. 
Accessed August 31, 2013, http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis. 
NOVA. “AQM-34 Ryan Firebee.” Public Broadcasting System. Accessed June 6, 2013. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/uavs_09.html. 
O’Connell, Mary. “International Law of Drones.” The American Society of International 
Law 14, no. 38 (2010): 1–6. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. 
Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2011. 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Weapons.pdf. 
Pravda News. “Pakistan Destroys Major al-Qaida Hide-out in Military Operation near 
Afghanistan.” Pravda Hotspots and Incidents. September 13, 2005. 
http://english.pravda.ru/news/hotspots/13-09-2005/65825-0/. 
Pearse, Damien. “Afghan Civilian Death Toll Reaches Record High.” The Guardian. 
February 4, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/afghan-
civilian-death-toll-record. 
 64 
Perlez, Jane. “Chinese Plan to Kill Drug Lord with Drone Highlights Military Advances.” 
New York Times. February 21, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/asia/chinese-plan-to-use-drone-
highlights-military-advances.html. 
Plaw, Avery. “Counting the Dead: The Proportionality of Predation in Pakistan.” In 
Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of Unmanned Military, edited by Bradley 
Jay Strawser, 126–153.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.  
Rawnsley, Adam. “Iran Shows off Captured U.S. Drone, Swears it’s No Fake.” Wired. 
December 8, 2011. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/iran-drone-
video/. 
Roberts, Dan. “Obama Restricts Drone Killing and Foresees End to Perpetual War.” The 
Guardian. May 23, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/23/obama-drone-policy-counter-
terrorism. 
Roberts, Kristin. “When the Whole World Has Drones: The Precedents the U.S. has Set 
for Robotic Warfare May Have Fearsome Consequences as other Countries Catch 
Up.” National Journal. March 22, 2013. 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-
20130321. 
Rogers, Everett M. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press, 1995. 
Rogio, Bill and Alexander Mayer. “Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 
2004-2013.” Long War Journal. Last modified August 31, 2013. Accessed 
September 03, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php. 
Saletan, William. “Drones are the Worst Form of War, Except for All the Others.” San 
Jose Mercury News. February 21, 2013. 
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_22628998/drones-save-civilians-bombs-more-
deadly?IADID=Search-www.mercurynews.com-www.mercurynews.com. 
Schenker, David. “How the Israeli Drone Strikes in the Sinai Might Backfire.” The 
Atlantic. August 13, 2013. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/how-the-israeli-drone-strike-in-the-sinai-might-backfire. 
Schmitt, Eric. “Drones in Niger Reflect New U.S. Tack on Terrorism.” New York Times. 
July 10, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/africa/drones-in-niger-
reflect-new-us-approach-in-terror-fight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
——— and Savare, Scott. “U.S. Opens Drone Base in Niger, Building Africa Presence.” 




Shala-Esa, Andrea. “U.S. Industry Touts Drone Promise as Public Debate Flares.” 
Reuters. May 21, 2013. http://news.yahoo.com/u-industry-touts-drone-promise-
public-debate-flares-020214387.html. 
Shane, Scott. “Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy.” The New York 
Times. November 24, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-
house-presses-for-drone-rule-
book.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121125&_r=1&. 
———. “Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race.” The New York Times. October 8, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-
arms-race.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
———. “Judge Challenges White House Claims on Authority of Drone Killings.” New 
York Times. July 19, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/us/politics/judge-
challenges-white-house-claims-on-authority-in-drone-killings.html?src=recg. 
Singer, Peter. “Finally, Obama Breaks His Silence on Drones.” Brookings Institute. May 
23, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/23-drones-obama-
singer. 
———. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First 
Century. New York: The Penguin Press, 2009. 
——— and Thomas Wright. An Obama Doctrine on New Rules of War. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute, 2013. 
Shalizi, Hamid. “End Night Raids before Afghan Deal: Karzai.” Reuters. November 16, 
2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-afghanistan-jirga-
idUSTRE7AF1Y920111116. 
Shapiro, Walter. “Drone of Silence: The National Security Policy that Obama and 
Romney Wont Debate.” Yahoo News. October 26, 2012. 
http://news.yahoo.com/drone-of-silence-the-national-security-policy-that-obama-
and-romney-wont-debate-10251296.html. 
Sloggett, Dave. “The Utility of Using UAVs in Fighting Terrorism.” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review. July10, 2013. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&Ite
mId=+++1196017&Pubabbrev=JIR. 
Stewart, Jon. “Barack Obama Extended Interview.” The Daily Show. October 18, 2012. 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-october-27-2010/barack-obama-pt--1. 
Strawser, Bradley Jay. “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial 
Vehicles.” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 342–368. 
 66 
Strawser, Bradley Jay. “More Heat than Light: The Vexing Complexities of the Drone 
Debate.” 3 Quarks Daily. February 25, 2013. 
http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2013/02/more-heat-than-light-the-
vexing-complexities-of-the-drone-debate.html. 
Strawser, Bradley Jay. Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military. 
New York: Oxford Printing Press, 2013. 
Taj, Farhat. “Drone Attacks.” Daily Times. January 2, 2012. 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C01%5C02%5Cstory_2
-1-2010_pg3_5. 
Thistlethwaite, Susan Brooks. “Drones in Yemen: Fear as Foreign Policy.” Washington 
Post (blog). August 12, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-
faith/wp/2013/08/12/drones-in-yemen-fear-as-foreign-policy/. 
Teal Group Inc. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Market Overview.” World Missiles 
Briefing. Fairfax, VA: Teal Group Inc., 2011. 
Terkel, Amanda. “Lindsey Graham: Drone Strikes Have Killed 4,700 People.” 
Huffington Post. February 21, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/lindsey-graham-drone-
strikes_n_2734133.html. 
Torbati, Yeganeh. “Iran Has Advanced Drone Technology.” Reuters. October 28, 2012. 
http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20121029909777.html. 
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth Research Project. “UMASS Drone.” Last 
modified August 31, 2013. Accessed September 2, 2013. 
http://umassdrone.org/index. 
U.S. Army UAS Center of Excellence (CoE). “The Eyes of the Army, Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010–2035.” Federation of American Scientists. 
Accessed May 20, 2013. http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/drone-army.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02). Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007. 
U.S. Department of Justice, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Directed Against A U.S. Citizen 
Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or An Associated Force,” 
Global Security, last modified November 8, 2011, accessed February 4, 2013, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/national/doj-wp-imminent-
threat.htm. 
Volker, Kurt. “The Risk of Relying on Drones.” Washington Post. October 28, 2012. 
http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20121028909732.html. 
 67 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 
New York: Basic Books, 2006. 
Wassenaar Arrangement. “Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technology.” August 13, 2013. 
http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/index.html.  
White House. “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.” News 
release. May 23, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. 
Whitlock, Craig. “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations.” The Washington 
Post. October 25, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-
11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_print.html. 




Wood, David. “American Drones Ignite New Arms Race from Gaza to Iran to China.” 
Huffington Post. November 27, 2012. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones_n_2199193.html. 
Zakaria, Tabassum. “As Drone Monopoly Frays, Obama Seeks Global Rule.” Reuters. 
March 17, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/17/us-usa-security-
drones-idUSBRE92G02720130317. 
Zapfe, Martin and Perm Mahadevan. “Descending Drones.” July 2013. Center for 
Security Studies. http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-137-
EN.pdf. 
Zenko, Micah. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies.” Last modified January 2013. 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 69 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
